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INTRODUCTION
We can portray the past as a near or distant landscape…We can perceive shapes through the fog and mist, we can speculate as to their significance, and sometimes we can even agree among ourselves as to what these are. Barring the invention of a time machine, though, we can never go back there to see for sure.
-John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History
Ab uno disce omnes -Virgil
The Prussian strategist, Carl von Clausewitz, observed in On War that history becomes less useful the further back one travels in time due to a loss of details and context. 1 While military theorists and strategists prior to Clausewitz made ample use of ancient history to develop their theories on warfare, those who came after generally had a distinct disregard for pre-gunpowder
conflict. This was due in part to Clausewitz's admonition of quackery against those who made the attempt. 2 As the weapons of war changed, many felt that the old styles of warfare had nothing left to teach. As a result, many contemporary historians and theorists find no reason to study ancient history's landmark battles. 3 Unsurprisingly, today's operational artist lacks a firm grounding in the study of ancient military operations.
Do modern theorists read too much into Clausewitz's admonishments on the utility of ancient history? Does a trip backward in time make history too abstract and therefore less useful?
These questions are ones modern theorists should ask. Of course, not all modern theorists disregard ancient history. One such theorist that sought to understand warfare through both ancient and modern battles was United States Air Force Colonel (retired) John Boyd. He extensively studied ancient warfare in order to formulate his theories on maneuver warfare. An Air Force fighter pilot by trade, Boyd began to study history during the development of the A-10
Thunderbolt II, seeking to understand how the close air support (CAS) aircraft would complement armored maneuver warfare. 4 How Boyd used ancient history in theory development is relevant to today's operational artist and can serve as an example of the utility of ancient history.
In developing his theories on maneuver warfare, Boyd read history backwards. He first analyzed trench, maneuver and guerilla warfare in the 20th century. Boyd then turned his focus to warfare as practiced by Napoleon, the Mongol Horde, Romans and Carthaginians, and ancient
Greeks. Stopping when he reached Sun Tzu, the result of Boyd's studies was a synthesis of warfare from the beginning of recorded history to today. By combining his study of history with systems theory and his knowledge on how people make decisions, Boyd put together his magnum opus, a massive deck of acetate slides called "Patterns of Conflict" which guided marathon briefings on his theories. Additionally, combining his study of history with his knowledge of energy management in air-to-air combat, Boyd constructed his best-known theory, the ObserveOrient-Decide-Act (OODA) Loop. 5 The basic OODA loop is a simplification of his theories on decision-making and maneuver warfare which demonstrate how an individual or organization makes decisions and how one can "maneuver" inside his opponents decision cycle thus causing them to make a critical error.
Research Question and Significance
The question for consideration is what utility does ancient military history have for the development of modern theories of warfare? Addressing this question requires a detailed examination of how one historian and theorist has used history in his work. Analyzing the ancient battles used by John Boyd in the development of his theories will provide a baseline and a framework from which the operational artist can start to construct theory. Because Boyd never formally published his work beyond "Destruction and Creation," his briefings are extremely important to understanding his use of history. Unfortunately, "Patterns of Conflict" gives very few notes as to what Boyd discussed during his presentations. Fortunately, Boyd documented the sources he used for his analysis (though direct citations are missing). While problematic to the researcher looking to replicate Boyd's analysis, Boyd's briefing slides still provide a wealth of information on what he saw as the major points from his historical analysis and how they fit into his overall narrative. In analyzing Boyd's theory development, this monograph compares the interpretations of other historians to further demonstrate the utility of ancient history.
Hypothesis
Ancient history is useful for the development of modern military theories. Clausewitz's remarks on the use of history do not discount this utility. One modern military theorist that effectively used ancient military history in the development of his theories was John Boyd.
Ancient history played a significant role in the development of his theories on maneuver warfare.
The abstract concepts he synthesized provide valuable instruction to modern operational artists on how to use ancient history in the development of their own theories and doctrine. Boyd arrived at the past with his theories in mind and then went searching for proof. When analyzed in conjunction with other analyses of the Battles of Cannae and the Mongol invasion of Europe,
Boyd's case studies demonstrate the utility of ancient history and highlight the need for greater understanding of ancient history to better our understanding of modern warfare. Maneuver on the battlefield is not enough, though. To accomplish the shock and surprise necessary to overwhelm the enemy and cause their decision cycle to stall, Boyd presents a third kind of warfare-moral. In Boyd's theory, small light forces utilize moral warfare by relying heavily on leadership and trust. Throughout history, guerillas and revolutionaries relied on this style of warfare to overcome their enemies. When combined with maneuver warfare, as in the case of Genghis Khan and the Mongols, the effects could be devastating. 31 It is this combination of maneuver and moral warfare that Boyd highlighted as the preferred style for modern maneuver forces. His theories went beyond mere tactical application, though. Boyd expanded them to address operational issues through command and control of those forces and to strategic goals that made the style of warfare possible.
32
Other than a short essay titled "Destruction and Creation", Boyd never published his theories in written form, leaving that work to his followers. Part of the reason Boyd never published was that he never wanted to finish an intellectual effort. As he made changes, he would notice mistakes in his earlier thought processes and start over. 33 Boyd never viewed his work as being complete, only existing in a temporary manner between creation and destruction. Boyd was always learning and feared that to publish would fix his ideas in time, which would then yield their own entropic destruction. 70 Ibid., 69. The famed march of the elephants across the Alps occurred during this time, though they were largely ineffective due to losses and by Cannae, the Romans had figured out how to counteract their effectiveness. Enraged by the disaster that had befallen their armies, Rome embarked on a campaign of revenge against Hannibal's forces, which eventually resulted in the destruction of Carthage at the end of the Third Punic War. Prior to Cannae, Rome was a republic focused on conquering the surrounding Latin tribes. Rome's defeat at Cannae became the catalyst for their future empire.
What has fascinated historians and military theorists, Boyd included, is how a much smaller force of Carthaginians was able to defeat the numerically and qualitatively superior Roman Army.
Boyd's Analysis
Outlining the historical period in general from 300 BC to 1400 AD, Boyd emphasized several maneuver characteristics of armies. Armies would use light troops to unmask enemy activities, distort their own, and confuse enemy operations. 71 Heavy troops would then smash the confused enemy forces by attacking their weak points or alternately hold the enemy formations in place in order to make them vulnerable to continued light attacks. This light maneuver and heavy thrust against confused troops was the central idea behind Boyd's maneuver theories.
What Boyd drew from Cannae specifically was the superiority of maneuver on the were full of raw recruits. Earlier in the campaign, Hannibal had soundly defeated the Romans three other times in a two-year span; though not nearly as individually destructive as Cannae would prove to be, these battles forced the Romans to rebuild their legions. A third of Rome's frontline troops of more than a third of a million men of military age were to be killed, wounded, or captured at Ticinus, Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannae. 93 Additionally, the Roman army that met
Hannibal at the Battle of Cannae was comprised of four legions when the normal army was two.
This increased size made the normally mobile Roman legions more unwieldy on the battlefield.
Finally, the Roman legion was short on cavalry. The Carthaginian cavalry was actually much stronger than the Roman forces. While the Roman infantry outnumbered the Carthaginian infantry, their cavalry was outnumbered two to one. Additionally, the Carthaginian cavalry was comprised of Numidian and steppelike warriors. Khan used to prevent mistakes from creeping into orders over repeated retellings. He instituted a system where commanders gave all orders in a highly codified rhyming system. This allowed soldiers to easily remember orders and transmit them if necessary. 123 This easy transmission of orders, along with the wide latitude Genghis gave to his commanders, allowed the Mongol Horde to adapt quickly to changing conditions in battle. Genghis Khan also had the advantage of lessons learned from a lifetime of warfare; he had known some of his troops and officers for more than a quarter century. 124 These elements contribute to the effectiveness of the Mongols style of maneuver warfare; they show that leadership, logistics, and command and control are as important as tactics.
Propaganda and terror were two other factors the Mongols used to great effect. Genghis
Khan sought to undermine his enemies through any method, whether social turmoil or battlefield terror. 125 Genghis made this warfare possible because he had a single purpose in mind-there was only honor in winning. The Mongols realized it was better to convince a city or fortress to surrender without resistance rather than become engaged in a lengthy and wasteful siege.
Therefore, the Mongols gained a notorious reputation for massacres. 126 This practice was in keeping with the precepts of Sun Tzu that a battle avoided or won before the armies met was the highest form of warfare. Spreading stories about the horrors the Mongols would inflict or using trickery was acceptable because it set conditions to allow victory and therefore honorable in battle. In the final slide of his presentations, Boyd summed up his theories with a metaphysical riddle. During his lectures, Boyd would start with a series of pictures involving disparate objects.
Boyd then proceeded to derive the concept of a snowmobile from a bicycle, a skier and a motorboat-each individual part contributed something to create a whole greater than the sum of the parts. At the end of his briefing, Boyd would then posit that a loser was someone who could not build snowmobiles from disparate concepts when facing uncertainty and unpredictable change. A winner, on the other hand, was someone who could. In today's operational environment, the operational artist must be able to build a snowmobile. Ancient history, as shown by Boyd's development of his theories on maneuver warfare, is another tool available to aid in planning in the face of uncertainty. History, both ancient and modern, serves as an example of how others have tackled the problems we face in today's often uncertain operating environment.
From these objects, one could postulate the existence of a snowmobile, an object that is more than the sum of its parts. In order to create the snowmobile, one has to be willing to adapt his thoughts to the situation at hand. 
